Financial institutions are facing increased pressure to enhance shareholder value. This has lead to the popularity of practical techniques such as EVA r and RAROC TM . The major purpose of this study is to illustrate the interaction between incentive-based compensation and performance evaluation in a multiperiod setting. We demonstrate that while EVA can justifiably be used to incentivize managers to make better current investment decisions, performance measurement techniques such as RAROC help the firm to better assess abilities for the future. The model is applied to understand why hard position limits are employed as well as softer incentive contracts and what sort of termination standard should be used for the investment manager.
system is the opportunity for learning." Risk management has been the subject of considerable academic and practitioner interest in recent years. For instance, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) , Merton and Perold (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) illustrate that due to imperfections in capital markets banks have a preference for debt finance.
The costs of financial distress are considerable and must be accounted for in determining the optimal capital structure. Efficient risk management procedures can therefore free up costly equity capital and thereby enhance shareholder value. Some of the practical difficulties present in the capital allocation problem are discussed by Kimball (1997) . Uyemura, Kantor and Pettit (1996) and Kimball (1998) discuss the use of EVA in measuring performance in the financial industry. Zaik, Walter, Kelling and James (1996) describe the use of RAROC at Bank of America.
Risk-based capital allocation procedures are extensively documented in Matten (1996) . Milbourn and Thakor (1996) develop an agency-based model of the capital allocation and managerial compensation process. The theoretical justification for EVA and the use of other residual income based performance measures goes back quite some time (Preinreich, 1937) . More recent papers include Feltham and Ohlson (1995) , Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) .
Capital allocation can be regarded as an application of some of the principles of capital budgeting.
One of the earliest papers to look at the consequences of asymmetric information was Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) . More recently impacts of delegation have been studied in Harris and Raviv (1996) , Harris and Raviv (1998) and Bernardo, Cai and Luo (2000) .
In this paper we develop a two period model in which an investment manager observes a signal of investment productivity and then must communicate to the firm what level of capital should be allocated to his investment activities. Because the manager can undertake multiple investment projects required capital is an increasing function of his activity choice. However, while risk increases with the scale of investment activities, the amount of learning also increases. As a result there is a tradeoff between the value of learning and the amount of risk undertaken. Learning benefits the firm in the second period because it can utilize this information in the subsequent capital allocation process. An agency problem arises in the delegation process because the manager has a tendency to increase risk beyond the optimal point while attempting to maximize the amount of learning. As a result it becomes The model is applied in a number of ways to indicate potential theoretical justification of procedures often used in practice. For instance why are hard position limits often employed in addition to softer incentive procedures? Furthermore, what sort of performance measurement standard should be used in deciding whether to retain or terminate the manager after some initial experience?
The paper is divided into five subsequent sections. Section 2 sets forth the basic story. Section 3 solves for the optimal capital allocation schedule and section 4 shows how this is implemented in a delegated managerial environment. Section 5 considers the case of optimal termination and the implications of the paper are discussed in the concluding section 6.
The Story
In this section we set forth the basic model with the financial institution and a single divisional manager, who is responsible for an investment portfolio. The essential features are similar to those in Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986).
Timing and Events
Initially the firm contracts with the manager over a two-period time horizon. We discuss the exact nature of the contractual relationship with the manager in section 4. For the present purpose, we can simply assume in the absence of any contracting imperfections that the manager is paid a fixed amount in each period.
The sequencing of events is depicted in Figure 1 . Initially, at time zero, a signal, S, is learned by the division manager. This signal represents a market-wide macroeconomic factor that will be observable to the firm at time one and can be used for compensation at that time. At the initial time, it is only seen by the manager and therefore represents the necessary reason for employing the manager in the form of various investment activities. In addition to this market index, the expected return to investment activities is influenced by the ability of the manager. At the initial time we assume that the manager and the firm have symmetric information about managerial ability.
On the basis of the privately observed signal, the manager reports the level of investment activities that she would like to engage in over the initial period. This level, denoted by N , can be thought of as representing the number of individual investments that are advocated by the manager. For instance if the division represents bank lending (credit) activity, then N might represent simply the number of loans made in a given geographical area for a specific purpose. Or if the division represents the bank's trading book, then N is related to the size of its trading portfolio. As a final example, if the division is engaged in yield curve asset transformation, N would represent the magnitude of duration mis-matching between the asset and liability side.
Another interpretation of the variable N is relevant. If we think of a time interval over which the manager is allowed to operate before any form of performance assessment is made, then N could be interpreted as the number of periods of cash flow observations that are made.
In many cases these investment activities will require actual capital to conduct. In other cases such as in financial derivatives, very little up front capital is required. Nevertheless, since these activities are risky they impose risk on the financial claimholders of the institution in relation to its financial structure. The institution, either because of regulatory constraints, or its own internal optimal capital structure considerations then raises equity capital, C, in order to support the desired level of economic activity.
The first period is long enough so that further information about the project outcomes becomes available at time 1. We refer to these outcome-related informational variables as cash flows, y i . In general, though, these should be thought of as being sufficiently general to encompass other valuationrelated measures such as changes in the value of marketable securities. Cash flows will be stochastic, although they will be related to a number of factors: the return on the market, S, the number of projects engaged in, N and the ability of the manager at forecasting cash flows.
On the basis of the cash flow outcomes and the decisions of the manager, the firm then reassesses the managers ability in order to decide on the appropriate investment strategy for the second period.
We denote the posterior ability level of the manager as θ p as updated from the prior after observing first-period cash flows. Once again the manager observes a second period signal, S 2 and then reports on a desired level of activities for the second period. The original amount of capital is adjusted to C 2 .
As before, at the end of the second period, cash flows from the second period are observed and payouts to the manager and the firm are made in connection with the agreed-upon compensation contract.
Investment Opportunities and Activity Selection
The most significant assumption we make is that there is a negative relation between the marginal net present value of an investment activity and the number of activities that the division engages in. We represent this is a very simple way; the incremental expected cash flow from engaging in a marginal project is a linearly decreasing function of the number of projects. This embodies the notion that better projects will be adopted first. Specifically, we assume that the first-period cash flow for project, i, y i satisfies the following linear relationship:
where i represents both the effect of managerial ability as well as idiosyncratic risk inherent in the project. Project rankings are accounted for by the coefficient b. Equation (1) indicates that the cash flow has three components: a market factor, an idiosyncratic factor that is related to managerial ability and an index of profitability.
We assume that S is distributed over [0,S] on the positive real line with distribution function, F . On the other hand, i are all distributed normally with common mean θ and standard deviation, σ . We incorporate learning about managerial ability into the model by assuming that at time zero, the institution and manager believe that θ is normally distributed with prior mean θ 0 and standard deviation, σ θ . After cash flows are observed the mean estimate will be updated. We assume that the standard deviation is measured precisely ex ante, so that there is no updating of the precision of i .
The combination of projects yields an overall portfolio risk. Here we denote this risk as σ y , the standard deviation of total cash flow y i . The institution takes this cash flow risk into account in its optimal capital structure. Because of a preference for debt as opposed to equity for given cash flow risk, we assume that the binding constraint on equity capital is given by a value at risk (VaR) constraint. 3
Equity capital, C, is set equal to the overall institution's portfolio VaR. When the capital structure constraint is represented in this way, we are assuming that y i is expressed as a cash flow to equity (i.e., net of any interest-related costs associated with the actual capital that must be invested up front). The equity capital is then assumed to be invested risklessly over the period (so that it does not distort the original VaR calculation).
If cash flows are assumed to be distributed normally, then
for some constant factor, α. The firm is assumed to face a constant cost of capital, r.
The objective of the firm
We are now ready to define the economic value added, EVA, of the sequence of projects selected by the manager. EVA is given by
The question of how σ y is determined depends on the information available to the firm at the time capital is chosen. As we shall subsequently argue, the firm will be able to infer from the manager's project selection decisions what signal was observed. In this sense, the model is payoff equivalent to a setting in which the manager reports the signal to the firm and the firm dictates the level of investment activity. Hence, if capital is flexible so that it can respond to different signal values, S, the remaining uncertainty is embodied in i .
Even though the i values are independent, for the purposes of choosing equity capital, the bank is worried about "worst-case" outcomes. Therefore, we assume that rather than taking account of the diversification benefits of independent projects, the bank is concerned about the possibility of systemic risk and therefore allocates capital as though the idiosyncratic risks are perfectly correlated. In this case σ y = Nσ .
Consider now the single-period problem of maximizing expected EVA when capital is flexible (can respond truthfully to reports of signals by the manager). Since the single-period problem is applicable to either the first or second period, we denote the signal as S. Also, denote the current belief about managerial ability as θ (whether updated or not). Expected cash flows are computed as
(Note here that to avoid needless technicalities dealing with integral numbers of projects we simplify matters by assuming that the last project can be scaled down proportionately in terms of expected value as well as standard deviation.) Then the single-period optimal capital is determined by the solution to the following problem:
The first-order condition for the optimal capital yields the following result (for N ≥ 0; otherwise
This solution is illustrated in Figure 2 .
To determine the expected single-period benefit from optimal capital allocation, we substitute for the optimal single-period number of projects from (5) above into the objective function (4). We then obtain the following proposition, in which the expected EVA is evaluated conditional on signal S and beliefs about managerial ability, θ: 
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition shows that expected EVA is a convex (quadratic) function of managerial ability, θ. The important implication of Proposition 1 occurs in the multiperiod setting. Since equation (6) represents the expected EVA in the second period, any first-period policy that increases the variance of the posterior estimate of θ has value to the firm. 4 Figure 3 illustrates the results of proposition 1.
Learning and Dynamics
We now consider the previous analysis in the context of multiperiod learning about managerial ability. In the course of this development, we will explore the implications of the initial choice of capital 
The Value of Learning
Consider the second period. The firm wants to maximize the sum of first and second period expected EVAs. Proposition 1 gives the expected EVA for the second period conditional on the value of the signal in the second period as well as the updated belief of the expected managerial ability.
We simplify matters for the second period by assuming that there exists only a single value for the market signal in the second period, S 2 . If the manager's updated ability, θ p , at the end of the first period is high, then clearly (6) indicates that the second period expected EVA is great. On the other hand, if the manager's updated ability, θ p < −S 2 + rασ , then expected second period EVA is equal to zero, because even taking on a single project would have a negative EVA. Thus, for low levels of managerial ability, the firm should essentially "shut down" the division.
One alternative to shutting down the investment activities of the division would be to fire the incumbent manager and hire another whose ability level is unknown. However, this will not necessary change the results. If there is competition in the sense that investment activities using the average manager type have zero EVA in the subsequent period, i.e., if a new manager has expected ability θ 0 and S 2 + θ 0 − rασ = 0, then this is not better than closing the divisional activities. In this section we maintain this assumption. It is relaxed in section 5.
The main benefit of the zero EVA assumption upon replacement is that the evaluation of the secondperiod expected EVA from the perspective of the prior period is very simple. As is demonstrated below, the updated ability estimate of the manager, θ p after first-period cash flows are observed is normally distributed with expected value θ 0 . Moreover, because of symmetry, the evaluation of expected EVA is particularly simple:
That is expected EVA is proportional to the prior variance on the estimate of managerial ability. This means that any first-period policy that increases the uncertainty in the estimate will have greater second-period value.
Ability Updating
In order to consider the consequences of learning on expected EVA for the second period, we need to compute the Bayesian posterior distribution of the estimate of managerial ability after the first period, θ p . Since we assume that the signal is observable to the firm at time one, and the firm knows the number of projects that were taken by the manager, N , the idiosyncratic project risks are exactly identifiable from equation (1) as
Denote the sample mean as¯ = i /N .
The problem now is to determine the distribution of the estimate, θ p from the prior and the observations of i . It is well-known that as the data are normally distributed and the prior also normal, the estimate will also be normally distributed. In fact,
Lemma 1 derives the resulting formula for the variance of the estimate. 
Further, σ 2 p as a function of N is increasing, with upper bound equal to σ 2 θ and has slope equal to
Proof. The details of the calculations appear in the appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that the value of learning for the second period is an increasing function of the number of projects accepted in the first-period. For N = 0 the marginal value to learning exhibited in equation (11) is greatest while the marginal value declines as the number of projects selected increases.
As a result, σ 2 p approaches σ 2 θ as N → ∞. These are very intuitive featues. Figure 4 illustrates the results of lemma 1.
RAROC Interpretation
Originally pioneered by Bankers Trust and now widely used by many US Banks such as Bank of America, the concept of RAROC has been a major development in the financial industry. RAROC is usually represented as a ratio with net income divided by the capital allocation and the cost of capital then subtracted as follows: Performance is judged to be superior to that obtainable through zero EVA investments when RAROC is greater than zero.
The ability updating procedure in the model can be readily interpreted in light of this RAROC definition. Compare equation (9):
For a diffuse prior variance, σ 2 θ → ∞,
Optimal capital raised in the second period, from (5), is given by
as long as C 2 ≥ 0. Since next periods capital is a linear function of θ p , the following proposition shows that capital allocated for the second period is a linear function of RAROC in the first period.
Proposition 2. For a diffuse prior variance of managerial ability, and for θ p ≥ θ 0 , optimal second period capital allocation, C 2 is given by
Proof. Rewriting (13) gives
We can interpret RAROC in our model as
Substituting into (14) then yields
Cancelling the terms in the numerator involving r yields equation (15).
Proposition (2) shows that conditional on the first-period signal, second period capital is linear in RAROC. The proposition also shows that in order to determine exact capital, RAROC should be adjusted (indexed) by the ex ante signal, S, as well as the depreciation schedule of project rankings. Of course second period investment opportunities, as embodied in S 2 are relevant as well.
First-best Optimum
The multiperiod problem with dynamics and learning is therefore equivalent to: 
Examining the terms in (17) reveals that the only term involving σ θ is the final term, i.e., the benefit of learning for the second period. In general it is easy to see the the benefit of learning is increasing in the ratio σ θ /σ . That is, the greater is the amount of uncertainty in the manager's true ability as compared to the amount of noise in the cash flows conditional on the signal observation. Figure 5 illustrates the solution to problem (17), which we denote as N * (S). For comparison, the single period solution from (5) is depicted as N . Notice that in the case of very negative signals the optimal single period investment decision would be to invest not at all. This occurs because the EVA is negative for all projects. On the other hand, the multiperiod investment solution is positive because of the value of learning about managerial ability. In the example depicted in figure 5 the negative EVA is completely overcome by the ability to utilize specific managerial ability information to optimal select the amount of capital for investment in the second period. As the first period signal improves, then it becomes optimal to invest in a subset of the feasible projects even in a single period situation. However even then learning still adds a set of incremental projects that, by themselves would have negative EVAs.
It is also true that the value of learning decreases marginally with the number of projects selected in the first period. This causes the difference between the first and multiperiod optima to converge as the initial signal improves.
Compensation and Agency
We now describe the nature of compensation contracting between the manager and firm in a setting where decisions on the level of risk-taking are delegated to the manager.
Contracting Imperfections
As mentioned before, in the absence of any contracting imperfections between the institution and its manager the firm could simply offer a fixed wage payment in both periods to the manager independent of the signal and the manager would then voluntarily report the correct signal to the firm. The firm then raises the optimal amount of capital and the manager undertakes the first-best level of risk in the initial period. After the first period, the firm revises the amount of capital in the balance sheet and a new investment decision is made.
The use of fixed wage payments to induce optimal behavior on the part of the manager is, however, not consistent with real-world imperfections on the contracting environment. Therefore we consider two main limitations to the firm's ability to enforce fixed wage payments to the manager ex ante.
The first impediment considered deals with the feasible set of second-period contracts offered to the manager. We assume that the manager will not commit to a second-period contract that does not reflect the updated information about his ability. Specifically, from proposition 1, the manager's second period wage payment is proportional to the EVA in the second period,
This embodies the assumption that the manager must receive some fraction, γ, of the EVA benefits that he can generate in the subsequent period.
The second contracting impediment considered deals with the nature of first-period contingent contracts. We assume here that even though the signal is observable ex post the firm cannot impose contracts contingent on the signal to the manager without his consent. This assumption is motivated by the intertemporal nature of signal observations. If this assumption were not adopted, the firm could essentially employ forcing contracts against the manager to costlessly coerce him into revealing the signal ex ante. In the real world signals are generated by possibly complex and proprietary information technologies. Managers would not be willing to enter commitments unless they are compensated by receiving some rent for the use of such technologies. The fact that this assumption is made does not preclude the use of contingent contracts. As we show below, the manager may agree to them as long as he receives compensation equal to what he would if non-contingent contracts were utilized.
In addition to the above two major assumptions, we also assume that the manager must be paid at least some minimum retention level at the end of the first period, independent of the signal realization.
We denote this minimum wage asw. To determine the reservation utility that the manager must be given in order to participate, we consider the manager's delegation problem given that non-contingent contracts are used in the first period. In this case, the manager selects the desired risk level. Let w 1 (N ) denote the manager's first period compensation depending on the number of projects selected. Then the manager's delegation problem is as follows:
using equation (7).
The Impact of Delegation
First consider what would happen if a constant wage in the first period were paid to the manager.
In this case with w 1 (N ) = 0 the manager would maximize σ 2 p (N ), i.e., would choose N = ∞. This occurs because of the second-period lack of contract commitment. Convexity causes the manager to always benefit from the highest possible variance in his updated estimate, which always occurs when the estimate is as close as possible to the true value.
Looking at the objective function of the manager (19) it is apparent that since the signal, S, does not enter, the only way for the firm to induce the manager to select a signal-contingent risk level, such as the first-best N * of the previous section, is if the manager's two-period utility is independent of the state, in which case the manager is free to do what is in the interest of the firm.
Since first-period compensation to the manager is bounded below byw, w 1 (N ) ≥ 0, and the σ 2 p (N ) < σ 2 θ as long as the manager's choice of risk level is unrestricted, the firm must provide the manager with compensation equal to
Substituting (20) into (19) gives the manager's two period utility as:
Equation (21) says that because the firm cannot force the manager into contingent contracts, the manager's reservation utility must be equal to the minimum wage level in the first period plus the maximum potential value to him of learning about his ability in the second period. Therefore the firm essentially must give up the manager's share, γ of learning rent in the delegation problem.
Notice however, that because the manager's utility is independent of the signal, the firm's optimal investment decision, N (S) will be equal to the first-best level. That is, the firm solves the following problem for every signal realization, S:
Since U is independent of S, this has the same solution as equation (17), which is the first-best optimum with learning.
Therefore we have shown that there is no impact on the optimal capital allocation decision due to delegation. Naturally this follows from the fact that in this delegation problem there is always symmetric information and no moral hazard problems. However even though no distortion is introduced in the investment decision, delegation is costly to the firm, as the manager's reservation utility level is higher than the absolute minimum.
Contingent Contracts
The previous subsection showed that in order to implement a signal-contingent investment policy the firm could neutralize the incentive to take excessive risk by introducing first-period compensation that is a negative function of risk. The question we next investigate is whether the firm can duplicate the optimum level of risk-taking by utilizing a contingent contract.
Even though a contingent contract that meets the manager's reservation utility constraint cannot do strictly better than a non-contingent wage, it may be interesting if it is able to do just as well, nevertheless. The reason is that the firm may wish to encourage the manager to improve the signal distribution ex ante, for instance through expenditure of unobservable effort. Although this is not formally considered in the model, it is clear that the use of a non-contingent contract can never provide any incentives in this respect.
Hence we now derive a first-period wage contract contingent on the state that implements the first-best risk policy in a delegation problem. Consider the following contingent contract:
where
Using (23) then the manager solves the following delegation problem using the contingent contract:
which clearly yields the first-best optimum, N * (S). The additional wage paid to the manager in the first-period, w 1 (S), from (24) is chosen so that the manager's two-period utility equals the reservation utility constraint of (21) at the first-best optimum.
These results lead immediately to the following proposition. 
Position Limits
There is considerable interest in whether risk should be controlled at the decentralized level using "flexible" incentive contracts such as EVA or through "hard" position limits that specify the maximum utilization of risk. We demonstrate below that a combination may be optimal from the standpoint of the institution.
We noted above that the optimal non-contingent or contingent contract allows the manager to extract rent whenever it is important to dissuade him from excessive risk-taking. This means that the firm not only gives up the manager's share of learning ability at the optimal investment choice, but also a share of the maximum potential value. As this is costly to the firm, we now investigate the use of position limits in addition to contingent contracting based on EVA.
Going back to equation (21) we see that if the firm decides ex ante to limit access to capital to some maximum amount, N ≤N , then it has the potential to eliminate some of this rent extraction by the manager, at the cost of distorting investment policy for some signals. The question is whether the use of position limits can be optimal.
The use of position limits can be modeled as an upper bound constraint, N ≤N added to the delegation problem (25). Notice that if the firm combines position limits with first period EVA-based contingent compensation, then if position limits are binding they will be so only for higher signals.
is replaced by the following
and therefore the firm's optimal capital allocation problem becomes
where the expectation is taken over all values of the signal S ∈ [0,S].
Looking at equation (27) it is apparent that the benefit of imposing a strict position limit is that managerial rent consumption due to excessive risk-taking is curtailed for all signals, S. The cost of imposing limits is that there is underinvestment in projects that may either provide benefits in terms of learning about managerial ability or in terms of foregone EVA. But because the costs are expended only over high signal realizations, but the benefits are enjoyed over all signal realizations, it will always be optimal to employ some form of position limits in optimal delegation scheme. This intuition is formulated in the following proposition. Proof. We have already seen that whenever the upper bound contstraint in (27) is neglected, the optimal number of projects is a strictly increasing function, N * (S). Therefore if it is optimal to introduce a constraint, the constraint will bind only for S ∈ [Ŝ,S], whereŜ ∈ (0,S). Thus it suffices to prove that it will always be optimal to introduce the constraint. Suppose that the constraint were not introduced.
This implies thatN = N * (S). Consider the first order condition forN in (27) evaluated atS. This first order condition is
since the first four terms are zero atN = N * (S). Since the first order condition evaluated atS is negative, this implies that it is optimal to reduceN below N * (S), in which case the constraint becomes binding for some signals.
Termination and Competition
This section of the paper considers the implications of replacing the manager after the end of the first period based on the updated ability estimate. This sets the stage for considering the capital allocation problem with multiple divisions.
Threat of Firing
Previously we have assumed that if the manager were fired after the end of the first period, he would be replaced by a manager with ability θ 0 such that the value of investing in a single project in the next period is zero, i.e., S 2 + θ 0 − rασ = 0. Therefore the firm may just as well not replace the manager and eliminate the investment activity in the second period. This event occurs whenever the manager's updated ability θ p < θ 0 . Now we assume that the second period continuation value of investing is positive, in the sense that competition between firms does not deplete the value of recruiting a new manager. Henceforth, we assume that S 2 + θ 0 − rασ > 0. In this case the manager is replaced whenever θ p < θ 0 . 5 When the manager is terminated, it is assumed that the manager is unable to find substitute employment with another firm and therefore earns nothing in the second period. Otherwise, he earns, as before a fixed fraction, γ, of the EVA generated. Figure 6 illustrates the second period EVA to the firm and to the original manager. Notice that in the firing states (θ p < θ 0 ) there is a difference in the proportional sharing between the firm and the manager as the difference is paid to a new manager. 
Optimal Investment Activity
The analysis proceeds in essentially the same was as in the previous subsection; we first characterize the second-period expected EVA benefits as a function of the updated ability distribution and then solve for the reservation utility of the manager and the optimal decision of the firm.
In the previous analysis on learning the benefit of learning was proportional to the variance of the updated ability distribution, σ 2 p . This limits, to some degree, the upside potential of learning. With optimal termination, the potential for learning is increased and will be a positive function of the EVA generated in the future, S 2 + θ 0 − rασ . Lemma 2 evaluates the expected EVA under the optimal termination and is the analogue to equation (7).
Lemma 2. Expected second-period EVA using the optimal termination policy is equal to
Notice that equation (28) shows that the positive second-period EVA from marginal projects associated with the new manager becomes important now in two ways. First, it raises the level of EVA for all choices of first period project activity levels, N . Second, it multiplies the standard deviation of the ability estimate, σ p , which we have seen is an increasing function of N . Comparing (7) to (28) it is apparent that the benefit from increased risk taking in the first period is greater due to enhanced learning potential when the manager can be replaced with a better manager.
Although the expression for second period EVA has been derived above, when it comes to analyzing the optimal decision of the firm in the first period, we must consider only the remaining EVA left after the original manager has been compensated as well as the new manager.
Focus first on the utility of the original manager. As before, we assume that the firm cannot enforce contingent contracts without the agreement of the manager. Using contracts contingent only on first-period investment activity, we obtain
Note importantly in the last term above that because the manager is fired and does not earn anything in certain states in the second period, he does not share in the EVA earned by the firm in those states.
It then follows that the firm must provide disincentives to the manager for excessive risk-taking in the form of a first-period compensation that is decreasing in the amount of risk taken. In fact if position limits are not employed,
To evaluate the objective function of the firm, we must subtract the utility of the original manager as well as the expected payments made to the new manager in the second period. Therefore the firm's objective function becomes
Hence this leads directly to the following proposition showing that the firm maximizes once again the sum of first and second period EVA as before.
Proposition 6. When the firm can terminate the manager at the end of the first period, the optimal investment policy satisfies the following first-order condition:
where σ p (N ) and dσ p /dN are given by Lemma 1.
Proof. Differentiate equation (31) using Lemma 2.
Comparing propositions 3 and 6 it is easy to see that with managerial termination there will be greater levels of initial investment activity according to the optimal schedule. This is because the benefit of learning is greater. Importantly the value of learning is an increasing function of the extent of value creation in the second period, S 2 + θ 0 − rασ .
The firm can implement the solution to proposition 6 in the same way as when replacement had zero value. Using contracts contingent on the signal, the signal-contingent part of the manager's firstperiod compensation should be a fixed fraction of first-period EVA; he will then identify the optimum of proposition 6 because his second-period compensation involves an equal share of second-period EVA minus some non-contingent amount that will not distort his incentives.
Also, as before, if the firm implements strict position limits, the rent to the manager from excessive risk-taking can be reduced. This causes underinvestment relative to optimal solution of proposition 6 only for certain high signal realizations.
Optimality with Commitment
The analysis with termination was conducted under the presumption that the manager would be fired if and only if his updated ability level was less than that of a newly recruited manager which in turn is equal to the prior estimate for the original manager. It is of interest to explore whether some sort of commitment on the part of the firm might improve the welfare of its shareholders. The rent loss to the manager occurs as result of the need to neutralize the excessive risk-taking potential.
The most direct form of commitment would be for the firm to adopt a policy of termination based on the choice of N in the first period. Such a policy would not be immune to renegotiation, since the firm knows that whenever θ p ≥ θ 0 it is better off by sticking with the incumbent. Thus this is something that cannot reasonably be committed to. A better choice of termination policy would be to adopt a thresholdθ specified ex ante so that the manager is terminated iff θ p <θ. This could be interpreted as a threshold level of performance and could be built into the performance evaluation contract of the manager. This form of commitment is never something that the manager would regret ex post.
Note that under the policy of termination with θ p < θ 0 , the manager knows that regardless of the choice of investment activity, his probability of termination is always 1/2. Thus, he wants to maximize his upside payoff by choosing a high risk level. Ifθ > θ 0 the probability of termination is greater than 1/2. However this causes an even greater propensity to take risk. This is easy to see, since if the variance of the estimate, σ 2 p is small, the probability of termination is almost 1 and so the manager loses nothing by gambling on retention.
The result is different whenθ < θ 0 , i.e., when the threshold for retention means that the probability of termination is less than 1/2. Now it is possible that this type of firing threshold limits the degree of risk-taking by the manager. The reason is as follows. Here for small increases in σ 2 p near zero, utility increases because the manager is unlikely to be fired and is operating on the "convex" part of the expected payment schedule. However then for a range of risk increases, the loss of salary associated with firing becomes important and the manager is worse off. For very high σ 2 p levels, this result reverses and utility again increases with higher levels of risk. However since σ 2 p is bounded by σ 2 θ , which is finite, it is possible to design an appropriate firing threshold level so that the manager has the potential to take on only a limited amount of risk. This is illustrated in figure 7 , where the 95% confidence interval, 2σ θ indicates the maximum risk that can be attained. In this example, it is possible for the firing threshold to be set so that rent to the manager from excessive risk-taking is limited.
Therefore we have shown that the firm should give the manager a limited amount of "downside" protection against termination. Interestingly this result contrasts with Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) where it was shown that the manager would be provided with a hurdle to overcome. The reason for the difference is due to the asymmetric information problem considered in the aforementioned work.
Implications
The paper has a number of significant implications for the design of incentives for modern financial institutions. These are enumerated below.
Learning increases the optimal extent of risk taking
We showed that with the possibility of learning about managerial ability in a dynamic environment, the firm would optimally induce the manager to take on a greater number of projects than in a single period environment. Alternatively this would imply that the time interval over which the manager is evaluated should be extended to provide the opportunity for more cash flow observations. Hence, at the margin, the last few projects may have negative EVAs as viewed from a traditional perspective.
However this is overcome by their benefits in terms of providing more information about managerial abilities.
RAROC is related to the estimate of managerial ability
We interpreted RAROC-a comparison of the ratio of net income to capital allocation to the cost of capital-as measuring the posterior estimate of managerial ability. The reason for this interpretation is that the magnitude of cash flow realizations should be weighted by the number of observations, which is equivalent to the amount of risk capital employed.
RAROC should be indexed
In the model the signal of the manager is observable ex post. It is clear that cash flows net of this signal should be used as the means to evaluate the manager's ability. This provides justification for the widely accepted practice of indexing project outcomes in order to better assess managers.
Learning creates a risk-incentive problem
We indicated that when the firm and division manager are in an imperfect contracting environment where there are limitations to commitment, learning creates a convexity in the payoff function to the manager. As a result, he will have a tendency to adopt extremely risky positions unless counteracted through the incentive contract. Therefore we showed that if non-contingent contracts are used, the initial period payment is decreasing in the extent of risk undertaken.
EVA-based compensation is optimal
We demonstrated that the firm will be successful in implementing the optimal risk investment level through a contingent contract that is based on first period EVA of the division. Hence the current interest on using EVA in delegation environments is well-founded.
Position limits improve shareholder value
Position limits may be combined with EVA compensation in order to reduce the amount of rent that is appropriated by the manager through the risk incentive problem. This justifies the widespread use of such hard constraints in practice, coupled with softer incentive programs.
Termination
We showed that lack of commitment prevents the firm from using the threat of termination to limit the agency losses in the delegation environment. However with limited commitment, such as with the ability to enforce a comparison standard, the firm can benefit. Such a comparison standard gives the manager a small amount of "downside" protection.
Conclusion
The major conclusion of our paper is that the use of outright EVA compensation related to shareholder value creation must be combined with performance measurement based on RAROC in order to provide the right incentive system in a dynamic environment.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For N ≥ 0, substitute the first-order condition (5) To evaluate the remaining integral above, notice that
Using these identities, we can determine expected EVA as
Equation (28) is obtained from this expression after substituting for x.
